Abstract
I. Shift in Economic Policy and Cross-Listing
In its efforts to spur further economic growth, the Korean government has been searching for alternatives to the traditional Chaebol-dominated economic system, 1) which alternatives relate to the policy trend towards dispersed ownership and decentralization of economic power. One of the alternatives the government has seized upon is to support start-up companies, in particular through cross-listing.
Cross-listing of Korean companies has never been easy, due to the financial and legal hurdles involved. As of March 2002, only about 35 Korean companies are crosslisted out of some 1,500 public companies. Seven companies are listed on the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq, 2) three companies on the London Stock Exchange, and the remainder is listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. All of these companies are relatively large, with sufficient financial reserves necessary to bankroll such a costly undertaking.
3)
Currently, KOSDAQ, the securities market created particularly to support Korean start-up companies, is underdeveloped. Typically, any start-up company will have extremely weak financing abilities, and have poor access to skilled management and finance professionals. Further, start-ups in Korea have the additional disadvantage of not being able to benefit from the services of venture capitalists the way U.S. start-ups do, as the venture capitalists in both countries perform different functions due in part to the fact that Korea does not have a properly developed securities market to support start-ups. Thus, Korea has a classic chicken and egg problem.
4) It is unfortunate that so many start-ups with excellent technology cannot maximize their potential due to the lack of financial and other managerial support. Fortunately, the Korean government has recently expressed its commitment to boost the KOSDAQ market, and to support quality start-up companies. In this regard, it has come to focus on the cross-listing of start-ups, and now cross-listing is one of the highest priority issues on its policy agenda. The Korean government has even announced that until 2005, it will support some 20 firms in their efforts to become listed on Nasdaq. Although this policy announcement may have been made in a quite ambitious fashion largely for political reasons, it indicates the Korean government's determination to support start-ups to spur future economic growth. The Korean Ministry of Information and Communication is even sponsoring an investment fund that has been created for this particular purpose.
5)
The Korean government had previously allowed the Korean firms to cross-list only DRs, 6) not ordinary shares, because of its concern that holders of ordinary shares listed in, for example, the U.S. would have an informational advantage over holders of ordinary shares listed in Korea due to differing disclosure requirements and levels of sophistication. Thus, foreigners could only acquire ordinary Korean shares through Korean exchanges or withdrawal of the underlying shares of the DRs, even if the company were cross-listed on a foreign exchange. Hyun Young Shin, Venture Capital in Korea? Special Law to Promote Venture Capital Companies, 15 American University International Law Review 457 (2000) . See also Edward B. Rock, Greenhorns, Yankees and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital, IPOs, Foreign Firms and U.S. Markets, 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 711 (2001) . Korea Economic Daily, Jan. 7, 2002 , at 2 (reporting that the USD50 million fund would help qualified startups in the information technology area go to the Nasdaq). 6) American Depository Receipts ("ADRs") are preferred to ordinary shares by the foreign issuers for various reasons: (i) Certain institutional investors in the U.S. are not allowed to invest in foreign securities denominated in foreign currency; (ii) Sale and purchase of ADRs are not taxable events in many jurisdictions; (iii) There is no inconvenience related to exchanging to and from foreign currency for the investors; (iv) ADRs are favorable to the controlling shareholders and management in terms of maintaining their control because ADR holders cannot easily exercise their voting rights in the shareholders meeting of the issuing company. Also, it is easy to monitor the trading of ADRs through the depositary institution; (v) For most foreign companies, it is almost impossible to know the whereabouts of the shareholders in the U.S. because they usually do not bother to update their contact information for the company abroad. However, in the case of ADRs, the whereabouts of the holders may easily be obtained through the depositary institution, or the company discharges its obligation to notify the holders through notification to the depositary institution. For the law and practice of ADR programs, see generally Edward F. Greene et al., U.S.
5) See

Regulation of the International Securities and Derivatives Markets (6th ed., 2001).
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In January 2002, however, in addition to the announcement of its plan to support start-ups through cross-listing, the Korean government shifted its policy, thus allowing Korean firms to cross-list ordinary shares on certain designated foreign exchanges. The Korea Securities Depository ("KSD"), a legal entity established under the Korean Securities and Exchange Act is actively working to establish the necessary infrastructure for cross-listing shares of Korean companies abroad. For instance, the KSD has recently concluded service agreement with the Japan Securities Clearing Corporation and will do the same with Clearstream Banking Frankfurt (Germany) to assist Korean companies trying to list on the Tokyo Stock Exchange's Mothers and Neuer Markt (a subsidiary of the Deutsche Börse AG), respectively. It is expected that the first Korean companies will cross-list in Japan and Germany within 2002.
7)
II. Cross-Listing in the Context of Corporate Sector Reform
A. Corporate Governance and Cross-Listing
Korea has always experienced the various lengthy stages of Western capitalism's development within a much shorter period of time. Korea's experience regarding corporate governance and managerial accountability is no exception. The internationalization of Korean capital markets since the 1997 financial crisis has caused many Korean firms to begin thinking seriously about shareholder value. Since then, the Korean government has also made various efforts to reform corporate governance and managerial accountability-some of them successful, some not. 8) As a 7) While it remains questionable how many investors abroad actually will be interested in ordinary shares of young Korean companies, for many this is still major progress. The overall cost of cross-listing of ordinary shares will most likely be less than that of issuance of debt securities abroad. However, cross-listing of ordinary shares in the U.S. may take some more time because financial institutions in the U.S. are reportedly not amenable to such changes. Therefore, for the time being, the Korea's efforts are directed toward non-U.S. markets, including Japan and Germany. However, despite the increasing awareness and efforts to improve corporate governance since 1997, most Korean public companies have until now, including even those companies cross-listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq, paid no mind to the private ordering. Rather, cross-listing on foreign exchanges has been viewed primarily as a means of enhancing global visibility, 10) even more so than raising financing. 11) This is understandable, given the high concentration of ownership 12) and the substantial private benefits of control attendant thereto, 13) coupled with the fact that qualitative requirements for listing on U.S. exchanges 14) can be waived for non-U.S. firms.
8) See
15)
However, it is now time to make structural improvements to corporate governance and managerial accountability through reforms in the international securities markets. Cross-listing is an excellent mechanism to allow Korea to piggyback such reform efforts on foreign systems. 11) See Korea Economic Daily, April 6, 1998, at 7 (urging the Korean companies to go get financed through the cross-listing on NYSE after fulfilling the quantitative and qualitative listing requirements). In contrast to large Korean public companies, start-ups, with their substantially different ownership structure and financing needs, have much stronger motivations to cross-list, and despite having the same ability as large companies to obtain waivers of the qualitative U.S. listing requirements, they may voluntarily subject themselves to such listing requirements, so as to maximize their attractiveness to foreign investors.
12) See
17)
Their ownership structure is different due to the fact that: (i) the private benefit of control are much less for these smaller companies; (ii) their managers usually have personal incentives (through stock options) to accomplish high returns on equity programs; and (iii) KOSDAQ's qualitative listing requirements are relatively strict.
18)
Bonding through cross-listing may substantially increase their firm value and shareholder wealth while there is no obstructive rent-seeking controlling shareholders.
19)
B. Cross-Listing as Bonding Mechanism
In January of 2000, the Korean government disclosed plans to allow Korean firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange or KOSDAQ to list their stocks on foreign exchanges by eliminating current regulations that prohibited local/foreign cross listing. 
19) But see Nobuyoshi Yamori and Taiji Baba, Japanese Management Views on Overseas Exchange Listings:
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 3, No.1, 2003 As "the permission of cross listings will provide an opportunity to promote competition in the era of borderless global financial markets", the Korean government would "revise regulations governing disclosures and illegal stock trading to meet international standards and practices." 20) As mentioned above, implementation of this plan has reached completion in January 2002.
According to materials prepared by the Korean government, 21) cross-listing was necessary for the following reasons:
( i ) diversification of funding options for small and medium-sized companies and start-ups in international capital markets; (ii) promoting the growth of start-ups and small and medium-size companies with advanced technology by providing them with access to the overseas securities market; (iii) promoting stability to the Korean securities market by reducing the imbalance between supply and demand; (iv) enhancing the transparency and efficiency in management and corporate governance by means of globalization of the disclosure system, accounting system and practice in the securities industry; and (v) strengthening the international competiveness of the domestic securities market.
Further, the government anticipates that, as the sophisticated foreign securities markets require a high level of transparency in terms of disclosure and management practices for the listing of companies, cross-listing will act as catalyst for improving the disclosure system and accounting system of the Korean companies. 22) In addition, according to the Korean government, the cross-listing will: 
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( i ) promote efforts to strengthen the competiveness of the Korean securities market by enhancing efficiency in trading and substantially reducing transaction costs by introducing international competitition to the Korean market; (ii) enable the Korean market to cope with the global trends by establishing strategic alliances and/or co-operative relationships with the foreign securities markets; and (iii) help the Korean exchanges install the infrastructure to globalize their operations through the adoption of international best practices.
C. Regulatory Changes
In order to prevent Korean companies from taking advantage of the cross-listing for unsound purposes, measures have been taken such as designation of qualified overseas stock markets for listing, the tightening of public disclosure requirements of Korean companies listing their shares on foreign securities markets, imposing reporting obligations on transfers of shares, etc.
23) Several foreign securities markets have been designated as qualified stock market for cross-listing such as NYSE, Nasdaq, American Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Borse, Euronext Paris, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Singapore Stock Exchange, among others. Korean companies wishing to list their shares on such foreign exchanges are required to make the necessary public disclosures (i) at the time they decide to cross-list, (ii) when the shares are actually listed on the foreign exchanges, and (iii) when such shares are delisted. In addition, Korean companies listed on the foreign exchanges are also obliged to make public announcement when they become subject to sanction for violating any of the public disclosure obligations under the applicable foreign laws and regulations. They are also required to disclose in the domestic market what they disclosed in foreign exchanges. 
D. The Market Reaction to Cross-Listings
There are only three empirical studies available that focus particularly on the market reaction to cross-listing of Korean companies on foreign exchanges. 25) One study on the impatcs of cross-listing of 21 Korean companies on domestic stock prices 26) demonstrated that cross-listing on certain foreign exchanges such as the NYSE, for example, raised stock prices in the domestic market prior to the crosslisting while decreasing the abnormal return and the level of systematic risk on the Korea Stock Price Index after the cross-listing. 27) On the other hand, this study found that cross-listing of Korean companies on other foreign exchanges such as the London Stock Exchange and Luxembourg Stock Exchange failed to bring about such impacts on the domestic market.
Another study 28) focusing on the issuance of overseas securities by 127 Korean companies between 1985 and 1995 shows that the issuance of such securities has had the effect of increasing the abnormal rate of return prior to public announcement of the issuance while decreasing the abnormal rate of return after the announcement.
29) This study, however, also suggested the possibility that the findings may have been affected by insider trading as the abnormal rate of return began rising one week prior to the public announcement of the issuance. Further, the extent of price fluctuation varied depending on such factors as the type of securities issued, the size of the issuer, etc. For instances, the extent of price movement was more obvious in case of BWs or DRs than in case of CBs, in case of preferred stock than in case of common stock, in case of large companies than in case of medium-sized companies.
There is also a report 30) that analyses the price interactions for POSCO and KEPCO 
III. Cross-Listing of Foreign Companies on Korean Exchanges
As of this writing, no foreign firm has listed on any Korean exchange. In addition, no Korean Depository Receipts have been issued in Korea. The Korean government and exchanges wish to change the situation and solicit listings of foreign company shares, particularly from the East Asian countries.
31) Thus, understanding of economic and other positive impacts of cross-listing is important for not only for companies in Korea seeking to cross-list on foreign exchanges, but also for Korean exchanges seeking to solicit foreign issuers as well.
There are indications that foreign firms listing on Korean exchanges would have a sizable investor pool to tap into, as even non-institutional investors in Korea reportedly bought foreign securities in the aggregate of USD2.4 billion in 2001. While this is somewhat surprising given the high transaction costs involved and the degree of local regulatory restrictions, Korean securities companies, in co-operation with the KSD, have recently made the Home Trading System available for such investors, which will mean a substantial reduction in transaction costs. This again indicates that the Korean companies as well as the Korean exchanges need to cope with the global trends and accommodate the investors' needs. 32) Foreign companies are basically subject to the same quantitative and qualitiative listing standrads to be listed on a Korean exchange. However, there are some differences between the listing standards applicable to domestic firms and those applied to foreign firms. For example, a foreign company wishing to list on a Korean exchange is required to submit a legal opinion whereas Korean companies are not subject to such requirement. Furthermore, when submitting a business report, foreign companies must submit a copy of their public disclosure documents which have been submitted to the home country regulators, with the Korean translation. Differences between the accounting principles adopted by the foreign companies and Korean GAAP, the effect of such difference on the balance sheet of the foreign company and a summary of the financial statements of the foreign company for the latest 2 years to which Korean GAAP has Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 3, No.1, 2003 institutional frameworks to promote the cross-listing of foreign companies on Korean exchanges. However, merely establishing such frameworks may not attract a reasonable number of foreign companies to cross-list on Korean exchanges. According to the bonding hypothesis, Korea should provide them with the market environment with much stronger regulations and enforcement so that foreign firms would see the opportunity to raise their value through the cross-listing. Therefore, we see here two sides of a coin. Korea should keep improving the corporate governance of the Korean firms 33) to get foreign firms cross-listed on Korean exchanges. This, again, can be best achieved through cross-listing of the Korean firms on foreign exchanges.
34)
IV. Concluding Remarks
The Korean case may be the only example that shows governmental adoption of the piggybacking paradigm 35) focusing on cross-listing. It remians to be seen if other developing countries follow the lead of Korea. It will ultimately depend on the outcome of the Korean efforts. The story of Korea is particularly interesting because it tells us the opposite of what many developing countries pursue in respect of migration of their firms to foreign markets. What caused Korea to adopt such a policy? Perhaps, it was the exogenous shocks it experienced durign the financial crisis in 1997 followed by the involvement of international lending agencies in an unprecedent sweeping reform process.
Many commentators suggest that national corporate governance systems reflect each nation's cultural values 36) and political and historical experiences. 37) It has also recently been suggested that each nation's legal system determines its corporate governance system. 38) Thus, nations will clearly exhibit differences in such systems, 40) and as a consequence, regulatory competition and/or harmonization. 41) Such developments will inevitably pose a yet different and new kind of jurisdictional conflict, but, at the same time, will also promote the discussion and study of international norms, either bilateral or multilateral, that address international securities laws, 42) and ultimately contribute to the development of universal standards for the corporate disclosure and accounting systems with a world-wide applicability. The outcome of such discussions and studies will assist the policy makers and regulators of the emerging market countries, including Korea, in developing strategic plans for reforms to their corporate and securities laws, as well as the international organizations in carrying out their private sector development programs. [ 
